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Sector Reform 
 
NADEEM UL HAQUE 
 
“The commitment to reform cannot long survive, unless government provides 
adequate pay, recognition for jobs well done, accessible training, and decent working 
conditions.” 
 
 The Volker Commission (1990). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Civil service reform,” which has become the nickname for public sector 
management reform in the parlance of development economics, has only recently and 
grudgingly been accepted by those who advise on policy in the poor countries. Even 
then, the approach is somewhat paternalistic in that it emphasises externally-designed 
rules and processes for management, organisation, audit and accountability. It 
recognises the role of people in terms of noting that incentives and employment policies 
matter but only in terms of right-sizing the government and second to the need to spread 
budgetary resources over the politically chosen level of employment. What it does not 
accept is that and the drive to manage the public sector better has to be led and 
implemented by the domestic talent and in that they must have both the incentive and 
the honour of doing just that. 
This paper argues that the main reason that the public sector management has 
suffered in many of the poor countries is that incentives have been allowed to erode 
rapidly as public sector employment was viewed politically as a means of providing 
welfare. This lead to the outflow of many of the better quality people form the civil 
service and through adverse selection of the decline of work and ethical standards. 
Nadeem ul Haque works at the IMF Institute, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C., 
USA. 
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Public sector productivity has dwindled as a result while human capital which at first 
avoided the public sector now started to leave the country. To rebuild the public sector, 
these countries now have to rely on expatriate human capital in the form of technical 
assistance. 
 
1.  GOVERNMENT IN A GROWTH MODEL 
First-generation growth literature relied on the traditional two factors—labour 
and capital—measured in notional natural units and a production function that relied 
on constant returns to scale [Solow (1965); Cass (1973) and Koopmans (n.d.)]. 
Growth was, therefore, exogenously determined by the rate at which these factors 
grew which in turn depended on the growth rate of the population and the rate of 
time preference which determined domestic consumption-saving decisions and hence 
capital accumulation. Policy action was unnecessary and most countries in steady 
state would converge to the same level of incomes and growth. 
Empirical studies of growth however, showed that convergence was not taking 
place as suggested by those models [Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986, 1990)]. 
Moreover, factor accumulation explained only a part of growth. The large 
unexplained residual that remained was considered to be due to factors such as 
technological change and human capital [Dennision (n.d.)]. Over time some of the 
differences across countries has been shown to be due to variables such as years of 
schooling as well as other demographic indicators to capture human capital 
development, and government expenditures which are considered to represent the 
impact of government provided infrastructure as well as several indicators measuring 
 political, institutional and social development. These investigations have shown that 
the role of government and policy may be an important variable that could explain 
why some countries remain poor and others improve their living standards. 
Consequently, this paper examines the role of government in the growth process. 
Following Barro (1990) and Haque and Montiel (1992), government 
intervention is necessary for the provision of public goods such as the maintenance 
of law and order, administering legal, regulatory and supervisory systems that 
facilitate market-functioning, and the  development and maintenance of road and 
communication networks. Presumably, both the quantity and the quality of these 
public services affects the production process of the private sector and hence 
eventually affects growth. Thus, for example a safe working environment which 
prevails when law and order is being efficiently maintained means little loss of 
working time; a properly regulated and supervised financial market allows for more 
capital availability because of better financial intermediation; and an efficient and 
speedy legal system can allow for improved and effective contracting so necessary 
for market transactions. However, in order to provide these services, the government 
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uses available technologies and resources. It raises revenues by means of taxation 
and purchases inputs from the market the same as the private sector. The efficiency 
of resource use as well as any competition and eventual utilisation of certain scarce 
resources among the two competing sectors are likely to have important implications 
for the growth process.1 The relationship between the government wage structure and 
that prevailing in the private sector can be summarised in the following proposition 
from Haque and Sahay (1996) and Haque and Aziz (1998). 
Proposition 1. On the basis of existing technology, there exists an optimal 
government wage policy (relative to that prevailing in the private sector) 
that maximises government output, as well as private sector output. The 
compression of the government wage structure beyond this optimal policy 
are associated with welfare losses. 
We can model the government as operating under a production technology 
similar to that of the private sector. Thus the government produces a joint product of 
public infrastructure  as well as the efficient collection of its taxes. It does so using the 
standard inputs of physical and human capital within the technological constraints of 
the time.2 Both firms and bureaucrats, therefore, develop a cooperative contract in 
which the potential tax revenue is divided in three parts. One part is kept by the firm 
another goes to the bureaucrat while the third goes to the government as revenues. The 
result of all this is that direct tax revenue collections being to fall below potential for 
what is commonly and euphemistically termed “weakness in tax administration and 
control”. Fiscal pressures build up because of declining revenues, and are dealt with by 
a combination of the standard approaches (a) reduction in expenditures which include a 
cut in public sector wages, and (b) increased resort to the inflation tax. In either case, 
real wages are further eroded reinforcing the process just described: lowered quality of 
human capital in the public sector, a decline in monitoring quality and public good 
output reduction leading to an increased proclivity on the part of both bureaucrats and 
firms for corruption, and therefore a decline in domestic revenues. The cycle is 
reinforced. 
The above discussion can be summarised in the following proposition from 
Haque and Sahay (1996) which suggests directions for reforming the public sector. 
1Although the government produces a public good which is a direct input into the production process 
of the private sector, it cannot, given the public good nature of its service, efficiently price the service or the 
good it provides. It, therefore, finances this production by means of tax revenue collections both direct and 
inflation taxation. The collection of direct taxes is another function that the government must attempt to do 
efficiently if the difficulties associated  with the inflation tax are to be avoided. 
2In order for the story that is developed later, the production function must incorporate different skill 
or human capital levels and perhaps even allow these levels to be complementary in use (the manager-worker 
story). 
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 Proposition 2: Corruption increases and public sector productivity 
declines with declining wage incentives and when institutional 
arrangements are weak, i.e., when there is both a low probability of 
detection and a relatively minor punishment in the event of conviction. 
 
2. PUBLIC SECTORS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
SOME EMPIRICAL FACTS 
The simple model presented above illustrates the critical role that the quality of 
governance plays in determining income and growth in an economy. Unfortunately, 
there is little data available to test this relationship in a regression. Because the public 
sector has traditionally been viewed merely as a transfer mechanism, there is little 
systematic evidence available on input utilisation in the government or on the quality of 
its output. Reliable data on the structure of public sector wages and employment are not 
available for most developing countries.3 The studies that do provide information on 
some limited aspects of public sector management are only meant to provide a snapshot 
of the public sector at a point in time.4 It is not possible, therefore, to derive from them 
panel data of sufficient length to allow a formal empirical investigation.5 The available 
evidence on wage, employment and human capital policies in the public sector wages 
suggests the following stylised facts: 
 (a) Public Wages Decline in Real Terms Over Time: Evidence from a number 
of countries suggests that real wage levels for public sector employees have 
been declining over long periods in many developing countries.6 Table 1 
presents the trend growth in real wage levels in the general government. Our 
estimates include all the countries for which data were available and for as 
many years as the data permitted. The trend regressions indicate that, since 
the mid-1970s, real wage levels in the general government declined in 19 of 
the 29 countries. In the remaining five countries which registered positive 
growth rates, the highest was Ghana at four percent per annum. In transition 
economies, large-scale liberalisation of prices accompanied by wage controls 
led to a decline  in  real  wages  in  the  public  sector,  particularly  during the  
3Snapshots on the basis of sparse and disjointed data series are obtained from some individual efforts 
which demonstrate the nature of problem. It is surprising that there is no systematic effort to collect more 
information on this issue which is considered to be at the heart of economic development. 
4See Lindauer and Nunberg (1994); Chaudhry et al. (1994) and Van Ginneken (1991). 
5The information that is available is itself affected by public sector inefficiencies. For example, 
increasing public sector inefficiency leads to the problems of ghost workers that makes it difficult accurately 
to record public sector employment [see Lindauer and Nunberg (1994)]. 
6For example, as far back as 1983, Gould and Amaro-Reyes noted that in Africa and Latin America, 
salary levels at middle and low level were at times so low the officials could not even have a balanced diet. 
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Table 1 
Selected Developing Countries: Trends in Real Wages in General 
Government (Annual Percent Change) 
 
Time Period 
Real Wage Trend in General 
Government 
Argentina 1976–89 –3.1 
Armenia 1992–95 –45.0 
Belarus 1992–95 –14.0 
Bolivia 1985–91 2.3 
Bulgaria 1989–92 –17.7 
Congo 1980–83 –3.8 
Costa Rica 1974–93 1.7 
Czechoslovakia 1989–92 –11.7 
Estonia 1992–95 6.0 
Fiji 1985–93 –1.7 
Gabon 1985–91 3.4 
Ghana 1986–90 4.4 
Hungary 1989–92 –0.8 
India 1979–84 3.8 
Kenya 1982–92 –2.2 
Kyrgyz Republic 1992–95 –20.0 
Latvia 1992–95 7.0 
Lithuania 1992–95 –10.0 
Mauritius 1974–92 1.3 
Morocco 1980–89 –1.6 
Myanmar 1987–92 –0.5 
Panama 1973–91 0.6 
Poland 1989–92 –10.3 
Romania 1989–92 –8.9 
Russia 1992–95 –11.0 
Rwanda 1985–89 –2.0 
Solomon Islands 1988–91 1.6 
Suriname 1984–86 –8.3 
Ukraine 1992–95 –20.0 
Average*  –9.0 
Source:  National authorities. 
                   *Estimated from a fixed-effects pooled regression of the countries listed. The coefficient is significant 
at the 5 percent level. 
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  initial stages. For the sample as a whole, real wages declined by about 9 
percent per annum. 
 (b) Increase of Non-wage Benefits: The wage declines have been accompanied 
by an increase in perks  and  other  non-wage benefits that are not only harder 
to monitor but provided at a higher cost than the value or benefit that the 
recipient derives. As economists have known since Friedman’s argument 
against school lunches, the provision of non-wage benefits is an inefficient 
and expensive way of providing compensation: the cost of the government is 
higher than the benefit received by the civil servant. 
 (c) Corruption and Maladministration Increases with Declining Real 
Wages: Over time, the declining real wage in the public sector had two 
important effects. First, this wage policy results in a sort of dynamic 
adverse selection as productivity in the public sector declined as the 
quality of public sector employee declined in response to the wage 
decline. Second, incentives to rent seeking and corruption are increased 
as the public sector officials find that their decline in real wages can be 
made up quite readily by the marketing of public properties such as 
licenses and controls [see Schleifer and Vishny (1993)]. The declining 
human capital in the public sector lowers public sector output including 
the self-policing of the government.7 The costs associated with 
corruption are lowered and expected returns increased as a result [Haque 
and Sahay (1996)]. Declining public sector output also lowers private 
sector output and profitability because of the lower level of public good 
input that is now available. The incentive for firms to cheat the 
government is, therefore, increased. Additionally the increase in non-
wage benefits encourages and weaken  morally-correct behaviour as the 
incentive to maximise hidden non-wage benefits is set in motion. It is 
not surprising then that the declining real wages in public sector [Weder 
and van Rijckeghem (1997)] has been found to be correlated with 
corruption which in turn has been found to be detrimental to growth 
[Mauro (1995)]. 
 (d) Declines Larger in Poor Countries: The decline in government wage 
relative to per capita incomes is not uniform across countries. The poorer 
countries experienced a larger decline during the 1970s. During the 1980s the 
decline was reversed, but not enough to correct the declining trend over the 
entire period. 
 (e) Declining Public-private Wage Differential: Some evidence of trends in 
the ratio of public to private wage for countries for which data was available 
is presented in Table 2.  Once  again  we  see  that this ratio declined for most  
7An additional plausible assumption that increased education increases the aversion to, or the costs 
associated with illegal activities world reinforce this phenomenon. 
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Table 2 
Selected Developing Countries: Trends in the Ratio of Government to 
Private Sector Average Wages (Annual Percent Change) 
 Time Period Trend  
Bolivia 1985–91 4.0 
Costa Rica 1974–93 –0.8 
Fiji 1985–93 –27.0 
Ghana 1986–90 –8.0 
Kenya 1982–92 –3.0 
Mauritius 1974–92 –0.4 
Panama 1973–91 2.0 
Peru 1985–92 –25.0 
Poland 1989–92 –0.4 
Suriname 1985–92 –1.0 
Average*  –6.0 
Source:  National authorities. 
 
  countries.8  On  average,  it  shows  a  decline  of  about  6 percent per 
annum. Flanagan (1995) finds that full-time employees in the private sector 
earn considerably more than their counterparts in the state sector in the Czech 
Republic.9 
 (f) Stabilisation at the Expense of Public-sector Efficiency: Some recent 
studies on stabilisation programmes suggest that fiscal adjustments often 
involve a decline in real wages in the public sector. The data show that short-
term stabilisation programmes have a significant negative impact on real 
wages [Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995)] while they protect overall wage 
expenditures of the government [Hewitt and van Rijckeghem (1995)].10 It 
8Through a fairly comprehensive cross-country study of government wages relative to the private 
sector. Heller and Tait (1984) showed that during the late 1970s and the early 1980s the ratio of public wages 
to private wages was lower in developing countries than in industrial countries. This evidence is somewhat 
surprising since one would expect that in developing countries, on average, the quality of human capital 
would be higher in the government relative to the underdeveloped private sector [Heller and Tait (1984)]. 
9After controlling for schooling and potential experience, survey results show that workers in new 
private firms earn 18 percent more than those in current or former state enterprises. 
10Hewitt and van Rijckeghem (1995) examine the determinants of central government wage 
expenditures for 99 countries during 1980–1990. They found that heavily indebted countries tend to have 
lower central government wage expenditures relative to GDP. 
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would seem that such programmes protect employment at the cost of real 
wages. 
 (g) Wage Compression: Wages at upper levels of public administration have 
often been reduced by more than those at the at lower levels. Figure 1 
illustrates this phenomenon for several countries. With a base year of 
1975=100, the figure shows the 1985 wage level at the lowest (solid) and 
highest (hatched) wage levels in the public sector. Note that with one 
exception, real wage declines were experienced at both the highest and 
lowest wage levels in the public sector in this sample.11 The numbers at the 
end of each country’s bar group present the ratio of the wage indices given in 
the figure for each country, expressing the relative 1985 real wage index for 
those at the lowest end of the wage scale as a multiple of the relative 1985 
wage index for those at the highest end, converted to an index number. Since 
1975 is the base year, a ratio in excess of 100 indicates an increase in wage 
compression. The countries are ranked in decreasing order of wage 
compression during the 1975–85 period. Note that wage compression is 
observed for all the countries in the sample except Morocco and Benin.12 
 (h) The Political Imperative of Protecting Employment: During this period of 
compression and decline in real public sector wage levels, the share of the 
labour force employed in the sector remained relatively constant or may even 
have increased somewhat. The situation is illustrated in the left-hand portion 
of Figure 2, which shows the percentage of the population employed in the 
public sector in a group of developing countries drawn from the previous 
sample13 from 1975 through 1985, a period corresponding to that for which 
we have relative wage data. This steady share of employment has occurred 
despite the fall in wages in the public sector relative to other sectors. In more 
recent years, the right-hand portion of Figure 2 suggests that there may have 
been actual increases in the share of labour employed in the public sector. 
 (i) Hierarchical, Unified, Closed and Non-meritocratic Structures: Perhaps 
because of the paternalistic nature of the state, the civil services in most poor 
countries tend to be fairly rigid, often prevent entry and reward seniority 
rather than performance. Public expenditure management is our only measure 
of bureaucratic performance and it measures only budgetary allocations, 
without really concerning itself with the service that each budgetary unit is 
supposed to provide [Premchand (1993)]. 
11See Van Ginnekin (1991); Lindauer and Nunberg (1994); Chaudhry et al. (1994) and Haque and 
Sahay (1996). 
12The data show that public sector wages are, in most cases, lower than private sector wages at both 
grade levels, particularly at the highest grade levels [see Haque and Sahay (1996)]. 
13The number of countries varies across years according to the availability of data. 
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Figure 1  
 
Fig. 1. Real Public Sector Wages and Wage Compression: 1975–85. 
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Figure 2 
 
Fig. 2.  Employment Indicators in Some Developing Countries. 
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 (j) CSR Efforts by IFI’s Less than Successful: The conclusion of a recent 
survey of the most recent decade of civil service reform in SSA is that the 
first-generation reform of the quantitative adjustments has been completed to 
the detriment of the quality of the civil service.14 All the reviews of the 
almost two decades of reform suggest that the preoccupation of civil service 
reform has really been the containment of fiscal pressures and that deeper 
management  issues  of   ensuring  a  more  responsive  public  administration 
based on quality performance clearly remain. What is most interesting is that 
given the concentration of the reform on the broad expenditure-cutting macro 
requirement, there was not even a systematic effort made to collect 
information on key variable such as wage structure or quality of public sector 
management, let alone issues such as performance of government. However, 
these are the issues that the second-generation reforms will need to examine. 
In so doing, they will require a search for appropriate management skills. 
 
3.  SKILL LOSS THROUGH HUMAN CAPITAL FLIGHT15 
The consequences of the “incomes policy” that the government is practising 
needs to be examined a little more carefully. As the real wage in the government 
sector declines, it sets up an adverse selection process by leading to an outflow of 
the relatively more capable/skilled (highly educated), and perhaps even more 
honest, people from the sector. Intuitively, it would seem that the wage rate in the 
private sector has to be equal to the wage rate in the public sector plus the 
expected return from corruption for the same level of human capital. Legitimate 
earnings may be preferred, however, to illegitimate earnings because of the social 
stigma, or the probability of detection and punishment attached to the latter. Thus, 
for the same level of human capital, a premium to compensate for these factors 
would be necessary. Even if expected earnings are equalised across the sectors, the 
private sector would be preferred at each level of human capital. 
The possibility of adverse selection into government is quite possible when a 
declining real wage policy is followed in that sector. This would reinforce the 
stagflationary trends discussed above. There are many reasons why, in developing 
14See Haque and Aziz (1998) Nunberg (1996) and Lienert and Modi (1997) for more details on 
the impact of the first generation of CSR. 
15This issue received a fair amount of attention under the nomenclature of the “brain drain” in the 
seventies. At first, it was considered that since each individual obtains and consumes his marginal 
product, the emigration of the more skilled workers in response to economic incentives increases world 
income without reducing the welfare of those left behind. Additionally, remittances could improve 
welfare of those left behind. Bhagwati, pointed out that the loss of the scarce skills could produce and 
externality and hence reduce growth. However, this was before the era of the endogenous growth models 
which now accept the externality of education. 
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countries, human capital of a high calibre might flow out of the government sector not 
only to the private sector but also out of the country. 
 — First, it may be recognised that the high qc are perhaps more internationally 
mobile. One only has to look at the advertisements in the economist as well 
as the staffing of research and academic positions at many institutions in 
industrial countries to substantiate this. 
 — Second, in many developing countries, government intervention has 
stunted the growth of the private sector. Because of nationalisations, 
licensing, and credit rationing, many potential private sector activities 
may not have developed to absorb such people. This sector frequently 
may not have growth to the point where it can utilise the high level of 
human capital that may be seeking alternatives to government because of 
this process. 
 — Third, government intervention may not allow adequately competitive 
compensation to these individuals. Direct incomes policies or extremely high 
rates of taxation are examples of such interventions.16 
 — Fourth, the provision of the infrastructural or public good may be important 
elements in terms of providing quality of life to people. As the efficiency of 
the government declines, difficulties such as deteriorating law and order, 
impose an additional tax burden. In such situations those with mobility have 
an additional incentive to move. 
 — Fifth, the nature of the production process may be such that high q 
individuals may need to work in special environments that require large 
number of such individuals to be together or require specific forms of 
capital to combine with. This is the case of specialised research skills 
such as genetics and artificial intelligence research that can only take 
place in advanced industrial country environments. This would imply 
that the production function changes with growth and capital 
accumulation to allow increased usage of high quality individuals. 
 
Basically these arguments suggest that the policy has an influence over the 
quality of talent that will be retained domestically. While public sectors have been 
oriented towards wage compression, and economies have been growing slowly, the 
16Several multinationals have used these factors to advantage. They hire young individuals with good 
quality human capital from a developing country and use them at home in the early stages of their career where 
their level of compensation is in keeping with domestic market considerations. As these individuals outgrow 
that country, they move them into their multinational staff and pay them international salaries. Citibank is one of 
the companies that has used this very effectively. Such present value maximisation has also been used by 
governments where higher paying foreign postings have been used as an incentive to help boost the present 
value of individual earnings. Unfortunately, like most other areas of government activity, the effectiveness of 
such mechanisms has varied with the overall efficiency of the government as described above. 
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optimal response of those that had skills, and were able to migrate, was to leave the 
country. We have a fair amount of anecdotal evidence on the subject of brain drain that 
suggests that there may be a talent pool that poor countries can draw from [see Table 3 
and Haque and Aziz (1998)]. Given the relatively short supply of skills in these 
countries, even non-spectacular numbers appear to have consequences for institutional 
capacity. 
 
Table 3 
 Estimates of Brain Drain from Selected Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Country Evidence 
Ghana 60 percent of Ghanian doctors trained locally in the early 80s were 
working abroad-creating critical manpower shortages in the 
country’s health service. Human Development Report (1992) 
Nigeria Nigeria experienced migration of highly skilled  manpower. 
Particularly hard hit medicine, universities, and airlines, 21,000 
Nigerian doctors overseas. World Bank (1990) Davies (1994) 
Ricca (1989) 
Sudan In 1978 alone, 17 percent f Sudanese doctors and dentists, 20 
percent of university lecturers, 30 percent of engineers and 45 
percent of surveyors went abroad. By 1985 2/3 of Sudan’s 
professionals and technical workers had left the country. ILO 
(1985) 
Zimbabwe Produces 60 doctors a year—has lost almost 90 percent of these 
doctors to foreign countries. 
Davies (1994) 
Zambia Ministry of health has a shortage of doctors estimated at 549 
doctors. 
Chiposa (1988) 
 
Brain drain may be defined as the international transfer of resources in the form 
of  human  capital  that is not recorded in the BOP.17 Whereas measures of migration do 
not in any way distinguish between individuals, the concept of brain drain relates to the 
loss of skills or human capital to society or to the country from which migration takes 
place. It is meaningful only in an environment of scarce skills and relates only to those 
professional skills that require considerable investment and, therefore not easy to 
17The analogy with capital flight is made in Haque and Kim (1995). Perhaps because of its ease 
of measurement, the flight of financial capital has received more attention, though in may countries 
anecdotal evidence suggests that human capital may also be a major impediment to progress. 
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replace. Typically, the term is used to describe the loss of professional and technical 
skills such as scientists, academics, doctors, engineers and others with university 
training. 
Emigration of professional skills occurs for three broad reasons. 
 — First among these is the incentive of a higher rate of return, often at a lower 
risk, to human capital in the host country. The host countries are often able to 
offer market-determined salaries at lower taxes, unlike the countries of origin 
where public sector dominates the professions and has an ethos of non-
competitive wages. Furthermore, the host countries have a stable 
macroeconomic and socio-political environment that provides security as 
well as substantial creature comforts, both of which often are in question in 
the home country. 
 — Second, for professional survival and growth, it might be important to be in 
the professional centres that are mainly in the advanced industrial countries. 
Without participation in such centres,  the risk of professional marginalisation 
and obsolescence is great. 
 — Third, and related to the second is that poor countries, because of resource 
shortages or mismanagements, are frequently unable to provide comple-
mentary inputs for the practice of the concerned profession. For example, 
research scientists in universities may not have laboratory facilities, doctors 
may not have hospital equipment, etc. [See Danso (1995) and Davies 
(1994)]. 
Without going into further technical detail (for which the reader is referred to 
Haque and Kim (1995) Haque and Aziz (1998), the following results emerge. 
 Proposition 3. In a two-country world, where both countries are identical 
except in the level of production of G, there exists a cut-off point AM in 
the ability distribution of the country with the lower level of G, such that 
all agents from this country whose ability levels are higher than AM 
migrate to the country with higher G. Agents with ability less than AM 
remain. 
 Haque and Kim (1995) and Haque and Aziz (1998) show that there is an 
output and income loss with the migration of skills. Moreover, in both cases, the result 
of this migration is that the highest skill level in Ruralia, the poor country, is now AM<a 
where a is the highest point in the ability distribution. Since growth is dependent on the 
highest ability level in the country, it would be reduced as a result of migration. Growth 
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now is (AM–1) which is less than (a–l), the rate that prevails in The richer country and 
that prevailed before migration. Output and per capita income too are lower. The loss of 
skills is a loss to the poorer country in terms of permanent reduction in incomes, as well 
as in the growth of output of the economy. 
Proposition 4. Migration of skills can result in permanently lower output, 
profits and income levels in the poor country. Additionally growth may also 
be slowed down permanently relative to the richer country. 
Brain drain, or human capital flight, has been dismissed as the manifestation of 
mere nationalism and indeed some nationalistic leaders have even used the brain drain 
rhetoric to argue for control on migration or demand payments for the migration.18 The 
former group argues that the brain drain reflects the need in international markets for 
specialised human capital: human capital tends to move to regions and occupations 
where its productivity is high. Nationalists regard a minimum level of professional skills 
as required for the functioning of the nation state and hold that these skills are the 
property of the nation state. The debate is then often obscured by into the age-old 
question of “should governments curb individual freedom of movement?” 
As a result, the profession and development agencies have been somewhat 
ambivalent on this subject. At an aggregate level, human capital has been shown to 
be theoretically and empirically the more important variables for determining 
economic growth, with upper levels of education being strongly correlated with 
growth. Barro (1997) shows that upper levels of male education are strongly 
correlated with growth, with an extra year adding 1.2 percent to growth, while 
primary education is often significant and of the wrong sign. This is with the 
education variable being merely years of school attendance, without taking into 
consideration quality, certification and professional or technical attainment. 
Perhaps it is this inability to measure the scarce professional skills that is the 
concern of the subject of ‘brain drain’, that the subject has not received adequate 
attention. Despite numerous consultant and technical assistance reports for 
capacity building and civil service reform citing the lack of scarce skills as an 
important constraint to development, to date no systematic attempts at developing 
an assessment of needed skills in the poor countries has been undertaken.19 
The causes of brain drain and the measures required to stem it are often confused 
primarily because both proponents and opponents become preoccupied with the curbs 
on migration. The analogy with capital is perhaps appropriate here. Just as capital 
18See Haque and Kim (1995) and Danso (1995) for a fuller discussion of some aspects of this 
literature. 
19Considerable sums are being spent to collect data on corruption, political and institutional 
arrangements, living standards etc. but hardly any on the assessment of whether universities have teachers of 
adequate quality. Such assessment may be important if domestic institution-building is a concern given that 
ghost workers and unqualified appointments in professional positions can create the impression of adequate 
staffing. 
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controls are considered as undesirable for the prevention of capital flight, it should be 
taken as given that curbs on migration, no matter how cleverly designed, are an 
inappropriate response. The prescriptions for retaining domestic human capital are also 
similar to those normally suggested for attracting and retaining foreign investment: 
policies that foster market determined domestic returns to factors of production as well 
as friendly and stable socio-political environments. 
The design of an appropriate policy response must recognise the need for the 
retention of the professional human capital must first be fully established. It is 
immediately obvious to those involved in technical assistance and training, that for the 
maintenance of systems for supervision and regulation, provision of social development 
(including health and education), development and maintenance of infrastructure and 
governance in general, key skills such as academic, accounting, engineering, managerial, 
and medical are required at various levels of quality. At a more general level, the 
continuous loss of the educated will retard the modernisation process as well as the 
development of domestic policy formulation. Brain drain can also reinforce the limited 
ability to generate needed skills in poorer countries. As the Human Development Report 
(1992) notes, “emigration also reduces Africa’s capacity to train a new generation of 
professionals.”20 
 
4.  CAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPLACE LOST SKILLS? 
A standard approach to dealing with the issue of loss, or lack of, scarce skills is 
the provision of technical assistance. International agencies and bilateral donors such as 
United States Agency for International Development use this approach extensively. 
Skills that are scarce in a developing economy provided by short-term, expatriate 
advisers, typically, at compensation levels higher those prevailing in international 
markets.21 This is to compensate for undertaking the hardship of moving from 
metropolitan centres. The high cost of the technical assistance is justified since it is 
expected that institutional development will be encouraged as the human capital input 
of technical assistance can galvanise a modern system in a short span of time. Once the 
system has been set in motion, the local human capital can maintain it at the low salary 
structure prevalent domestically. 
There is no theoretical study of this model of technical assistance even though 
the amount of money allocated to such assistance is not trivial. To place things in 
perspective, Figure 3 presents data of technical assistance flows as a percentage of some  
20Surprisingly, little has been done to evaluate and understand the problem. The International 
Organisation for Migration has had since 1983 a programme for “Return and Reintegration of Qualified 
African Nationals.” Since the beginning of the programme about 1200 nationals have been assisted in 
returning to 6 targeted countries. The IOM is targeting another 1000 by the end of 1998 [Davies (1994)]. 
21Typically, technical assistance is made available in areas of public sector responsibility such as 
institutional weaknesses. In such areas, the public sector rigidly maintains an uncompetitive wage 
structure [see Haque and Sahay (1995) and Haque and Kim (1995)]. Frequently, policy intervention of 
donors, especially for short term stabilisation, results in a reduction of public sector wages [See Kraay and 
Van Rijckeghem (1995)]. 
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key economic variables.22 In Sub-Saharan Africa, it has averaged annually about 35 
percent of total aid and about 32 percent of the total exports for the period 1991–95 (see 
Figure 3). Even for Asia where aid and technical assistance have been operating for a 
long time, it constitutes a substantial part of total aid. 
Most countries that utilise technical assistance experience a substantial amount 
of brain drain. The anomaly of talent outflow from Africa and the inflow of technical 
assistance advisors to replace the talent has also been noted by analysts. Danso (1995) 
notes that “ironically there are 100,000 expatriates at work in Africa. Technical 
assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 50 percent between 1984 and 1987 and 
current  estimates put  the  total cost at $4 billion annually”, a number confirmed by the 
World Bank. While Pakistan imports expensive foreign consultants, its skilled 
manpower is being very effectively used in very senior positions by major institutions 
such as Citibank, Advanced Micro Devices, Upjohn, the World Bank, etc. 
For equity and other considerations, the technical assistance model prevents the 
migrants from a country to return as part of technical assistance.23 Any person who has 
22According to the World Debt Tables of the World Bank, “grants” are defined as legally binding 
commitments that obligate a specific value of funds available for disbursement for which there is no repayment 
requirements. “Technical cooperation grants” include free-standing technical cooperation grants which are 
intended to finance the transfer of technical and managerial skills or of technology for the purpose of building 
up general national capacity without reference to any specific investment projects; and investment-related 
technical cooperation grants, which are provided to strengthen the capacity to execute specific investment 
projects. 
23The TA approach, therefore always places foreign experts in a country. By design, therefore, these 
experts have to spend the initial period of their stay in a country settling in and learning about the country. 
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been a part of the brain drain can only return home at the low domestic salary and not at 
the technical assistance level of emoluments. The UN has actually mandated a salary 
structure in their offices that are situated in developing countries. The highest salary 
attainable by a resident in this salary structure is presented in Table 4 as a percentage of 
the midpoint of the entry level salary for an economist at the World Bank headquarters. 
Bear in mind that the UN local office jobs in many of these countries are among the 
more coveted. The structure of the professional policy-making/social science labour 
market in as follows: the lowest paid jobs are in the public sector; locally the UN jobs 
are preferred; and should the person be willing to move, headquarters jobs are desirable. 
It is not surprising then that the public sector lacks skills. What is surprising is that the 
question of the costs and benefits of the alternative channels of brain drain repatriation 
and technical assistance for institutional development in developing countries, which 
should be of obvious interest, are seldom studied. 
Proposition 5. If migration is costly, then it is cheaper to retain any skill type 
than import it from a higher income country. 
Suppose, as is usually the case, that skilled workers have already migrated. In 
this case, the comparison needs to be made between attracting an expatriate and a 
resident of the higher income country. To consider this aspect of technical assistance, 
we use the approach of Haque and Khan (1997) and assume that there is some discount 
factor k < 1, such that the migrant from the poor country, if paid kw, would be 
indifferent to working in rich country for wage w or returning home. Analogously we 
assume that there is a factor m > 1 such that a resident of the rich country if paid mw, 
would be indifferent to working in either of the two countries.24 Now for a given wage 
wTA, a higher skill level will obtain if poor country workers are encouraged to return 
than if the technical assistance programme relies only on rich country workers. If the 
technical assistance programme relies only on skills from the rich country, the highest 
skill level that returns will be Au, while if migrants from poor countries are also 
included AR < Au will also be induced to participate. The wedge (m–k) which arises 
from different preferences of the concerned individuals for living in Ruralia results in 
these differing levels of talent supply.25 
Proposition 6. For the same compensation, technical assistance programmes 
will attract higher skilled migrants than residents of a higher income 
country. 
24The value of m, can be justified on grounds of hardship and moving to a new environment. It is 
empirically verifiable given the relatively generous expatriate packages that are given to those 
participating in the programmes. 
25The result is fairly robust across different wage/ability profiles. See Haque and Khan (1997) for a 
further discussion. 
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Table 4 
Recommended Highest Salary Payable to Nationals as Percent of 
Entry Level World Bank Salary (mid point WB22) 
Country Year Percent 
Low Income Countries 
Burkina Faso 1995 35 
Burundi 1996 30 
Central African Republic 1990 75 
Chad 1996 52 
Ethiopia 1996 29 
Ghana 1996 37 
Haiti 1995 56 
India 1996 60 
Kenya 1995 61 
Madagascar 1995 16 
Malawi 1996 48 
Niger 1995 47 
Pakistan 1996 74 
Rwanda 1995 38 
Zambia 1996 52 
Zimbabwe 1996 48 
Countries in Transition 
Armenia 1996 17 
Belarus 1996 19 
Bosnia 1995 29 
Bulgaria 1996 21 
Czech Republic 1996 47 
Estonia 1996 29 
Hungary 1996 29 
Kyrgyz Republic 1995 14 
Latvia 1996 40 
Lithuania 1996 24 
Macedonia 1995 42 
Moldova 1995 17 
Poland 1996 34 
Romania 1995 26 
Russia 1996 72 
Ukraine 1996 32 
Other Countries 
Bolivia 1996 99 
Brazil 1996 158 
Ecuador 1996 11 
Honduras 1995 56 
Indonesia 1995 96 
Israel 1995 52 
Jamaica 1996 81 
Mexico 1995 139 
Morocco 1996 97 
Nigeria 1995 135 
Peru 1996 135 
Philippines 1995 80 
Saudi Arabia 1995 124 
South Africa 1996 80 
Turkey 1996 123 
Venezuela 1996 68 
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Surprisingly, current technical assistance arrangements prohibit the inclusion of 
Ruralian citizens. It is widely believed, even by the UN, that the difference of m and k 
(m–k), is very large (often a number approaching double digits in percentage terms). 
Given the human capital flight accumulations from poor countries and the limited skill 
agglomeration in them, this differential is clearly unrealistic. 
Technical assistance is generally considered to be successful in solving short-
term physical implementation and technical problems. “The resulting over-reliance on 
substitute technical assistance (long-term expatriate advisors) was rather ineffective in 
building long-lasting and self-sustaining institutional capacity”.26 Dia (1995) and Ake 
(1996) appropriately point to the major cause of this failure: that such civil service 
reform programmes do not take into account the macro institutional/governance 
environment and its impact on civil service efficiency. The additional point that this 
paper makes is that such efforts are quite divorced from the need to develop the 
necessary talent and leadership in the civil service reform programme. 
Technical assistance cannot be a substitute for the approach being proposed 
here—a comprehensive reform of the civil service that fully utilises domestic talent. A 
pricemeal approach to reform based on technical assistance can, in certain cases, lead to 
unbalanced development and less than durable solutions. For example, the “enclave” 
approach has been used for quick results.27 These take the form of donor-financed 
projects, management contracts with expatriate experts (e.g. DGTEX in Cote d’lvoire, 
French management of Air Afrique), or the separation and sometimes control of certain 
key government economic/financial functions by bilateral donors in exchange for their 
assistance (e.g. customs). Enclave entities are basically donor-driven, donor-dependent 
and unsustainable and often not in keeping with the drive for improved governance and 
better public expenditure management [Premchand (1996)]. They often result in 
dyarchical systems of accounting and governance that may not lend themselves well to 
control and management.28 
 
5.  ISSUES IN PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM 
Much can be learnt from the civil service reforms that have been implemented in 
the industrial countries. The well-known reform episodes that are widely quoted are 
New Zealand, UK and USA, all of which were domestically designed and implemented 
by local talent. Yet there are several common themes that emerge from them. The 
26Dia (1995). 
27Revenue generation is often considered an “enclave”. The generation of additional revenues 
without first addressing the weaknesses in expenditures, could easily lead to a further waste of resources. 
28Nunberg and Nellis (1995) note that interim solutions to pay and employment problems through 
specialised incentive schemes for topping up executive-level salaries for key government posts, or, more 
broadly, by widely supplementing civil service salaries through donor-financed activities are not enduring 
answers to the fundamental problems of civil service incentives; “indeed, they ultimately undermine the 
likelihood of devising a durable solution”. 
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Thatcher reforms in the UK (see Box 1), and public sector reform in the New Zealand 
are well known in this regard. More recently, the “Reinventing Government” movement 
in the US has been blessed by the Clinton administration. All these efforts have been 
made to enhance the productivity of government. This is done in several ways: through 
the re-orientation of the role of government to core governance areas, through 
improvements in  systems  of work and operations, and through inducing quality human  
Box 1 
Performance-based Civil Service in the UK 
Margaret Thatcher’s Government adopted the following principles for running 
the British government in 1988: 
 (a) Separation of service delivery and regulatory functions into discrete chunks, 
each one called an Executive Agency. 
 (b) Agencies to have control over their budgets, personnel systems and 
management practices. 
 (c) Agency chief executive to be paid adequately to attract talent needed. 
Performance bonuses of up to 20 percent of their salaries could be paid but 
they must be forced to reapply for their jobs every three years. 
 (d) Agency CEOs to negotiate a three-year performance contract with their 
department, specifying the results they would achieve and the management 
freedoms they would be given. 
 (e) Setting of annual performance targets for each agency. 
 (f) All agencies on trial for their lives every five years. 
Results 
 (a) 126 Executive Agencies, which employ almost 75 percent of all civil 
servants;  
 (b) CEOs now have the freedom they need to manage effectively; but both their 
pay and job security depend on their agency’s performance against 
quantifiable standards. 
 (c) If his agency does not perform, it may be abolished, privatised or restructured 
at its five-year review. 
 (d) Overall, the British have shrunk their civil service by 15 percent and 
performance has steadily improved. Operating efficiency has increased by at 
least 2 percent a year. On average, agencies got by on 4.7 percent less 
operating money in  1994-95 than they had the year before. 
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capital into government. The basic principles of reform can be summarised as follows:29 
 • Non-uniform, Open and Meritocractic Organisational Structures: 
No longer is the entire civil service straight-jacketed into one uniform 
grading system that seeks to put educators, policemen, jurists etc. on the 
same scale. Nor is only length of tenure rewarded. Instead the level of 
skill is contracted on terms related to its market opportunity cost. 
Selection is based on open competition and not only from the insiders 
and the insiders too are encouraged to be mobile. 
 • Incentive Based Systems to Attract Need Technical and Professional 
Skills: Public sector management requires technical skills and these skills can 
only be obtained through contracting with incentives for performance. The 
incentives could range from monetary compensation to recognition and 
honour. A high level position in the US public sector, for example, is 
considered valuable by the private sector and can be cashed in later. 
Consequently, these positions can be allocated at lower than market levels for 
the profile and expected compensation in the future.30 
 • Autonomous Professionally Run Institutions: Autonomous institutions 
that are controlled by governing bodies that are selected from the 
community where the executives are distanced from party politics under 
terms contracted with the elected government have been found to be 
efficient and well run. For example, central banks, educational institutions, 
hospitals, and regulatory commissions are all run in this manner in 
industrial countries. Efforts are made to find the best professionals to run 
these places. In order to do so they are given security of tenure and a clear 
goals for the duration of there tenure (see Box 2 for an interesting 
application of some of these principles to Pakistan). 
 • Decentralised Community-based Structures: For the provision of social 
services such as education, health and sanitation, decentralised structures 
firmly in the hands of the community are necessary. The ministries for these 
areas merely monitor and set guidelines and goals but do not get involved in 
actually running these establishments. 
 • Performance Based Organisations and Contracts for Managing the 
Public Sector: While in some countries the monitoring of budgetary allocations 
and the inputs of the public sector still remains of interest and auditing procedures  
29While Reinventing Government remains the most important approach to developing principles for 
the reform of government, I am highlighting the principles that I feel might be important to understanding 
reform in Pakistan. 
30It has long been known that veteran status from the army commands a premium in the market. 
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Abdus Samad, The Nation, November 19, 1996 
Box 2 
‘Decentralise, Professionalise and Autonomise’ 
 
Decentralisation 
Reduce the powers of the federal and provincial government and allow communities, 
towns cities and local governments to take over many of functions that are important to the 
community. Thus police, schooling health, parks and recreation can all be given to the local 
government. Two important outcomes of this should be noted. First, that the power of 
Islamabad has to be reduced and that duplication should be avoided. Decision-making as 
well as the utilisation of funds should devolve to the level required for the delivery of 
maximum benefit to the community. Secondly, both the federal government and the local 
and provincial government should be competing for resources especially the scarcest of all 
our resources—human and managerial. Consequently, the current civil service arrangement 
based on a centralised Public Service Commission, with an established hierarchy of service 
with federal service at the apex and the local at the lowest level would be inimical to the 
spirit of decentralisation. 
 
Professionalisation 
Our key ministries and institutions are managed according to an approach that was 
established in the last century. Even the English who designed that system have given it up. 
This system selects competent generalists early in life and offers them little additional 
training or incentive to professionalise and guarantees them key positions. Nowadays, in 
more advanced countries, the trend is for professional management in a highly competitive 
environment in both private and public management. Increasingly, governments are placing 
performance-based institutions on the basis of clearly written performance-based contracts 
in the hands of the finest professionals. Our system of a core civil service that has the 
protected right to all senior appointment regardless of professional capability is certainly not 
consistent with this. We have also seen the adverse effects of such a system and hence 
should be more than ready to reform along the lines of professionalisation. 
 
Autonmising 
Another modern trend that we see in all industrial countries is that of autonomous 
institutions. Apart from line ministries, most institutions such as universities, research 
institutions, school systems, regulatory bodies, tend to be autonomous agencies. At times 
governments can make key appointments, such as heads of agencies. Quite often, even these 
appointments are in the hands of independent boards of directors. For example, the 
government may be able to nominate a governor of a central bank but in most cases it 
cannot appoint a university president. Even where the government can appoint an agency 
head, tenure rules will prevent a capricious firing but hold the agency head to a clearly 
defined output goals. Hiring and wage and incentives structures within these institutions are 
not centrally controlled and subjected national uniformity standards, but remain an 
instrument of internal management control. 
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  are put in place for such accounting, in the advanced countries, performance 
auditing is practised. Performance indicators are determined and monitored 
and the contracts of individuals and public sector agencies are based on these 
indicators. The security of tenure of the chief executive and his team as well as 
the life of the agency can then be reviewed in the light of the performance on 
the PIs (see Box 1 for the Thatcher reforms and the use of the PIs). 
 • Open Transparent Systems: A. K. Sen pointed out that there can be no 
famine in an open society. The principle applies to good administration. 
Open and transparent governments are found to perform well. Because they 
are willing to reveal all and live under the scrutiny of the people, they are 
more likely to try to be careful about providing good governance. In turn, 
such a government is trusted by all. 
 
All these areas of reform are very important to the improvement of public 
sector productivity, and should be a part of the comprehensive reform in low income 
countries. However, we have focused here on the human capital in the production of 
governance good for two reasons. First, a review of the evidence on the utilisation of 
human capital in government in the poor countries issue suggests why this may be a 
critical first step in the direction of public sector reform.31 Second, the improvement 
of systems within government, such as the setting up of performance-based 
organisations, will also require skills and talent. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Management of the public sector which is a key element of economic activity is 
too important an element to be left uninvestigated. To begin with the role of the 
government must be carefully defined to ensure that the public sector does not acquire 
an over-reaching position of market dominance which stifles private sector activity. In 
that context, the more innovative approaches to the provision of public sector good as 
well as public sector management need to be brought into the mainstream of economic 
analysis and policy.32 
Human resource policy in the government should be such that the best people are 
drawn into government. While the education policy should be seeking to develop the 
quality of education at all levels, given the importance of public sector output, every 
effort should be made to place, and retain, the best available human capital into the 
government.  
This would involve not only the maintenance of a wage policy that makes the 
public  sector  competitive  but  also  the  elimination  of  other practices that restrict the  
31Some of this evidence is presented in Section III below. 
32Reinventing government. 
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(From Reinventing Government.) 
Box 3 
The Principles of Reinventing Government 
 
Catalytic Government: Steering Rather than Rowing 
Catalytic governments separate “steering” (policy and regulatory) functions from “rowing” 
(service-delivery and compliance functions). 
 
Community-Owned Government: Empowering Rather than Serving 
Community-owned governments push control of services out of the bureaucracy, into the 
community. 
 
Competitive Government: Injecting Competition into Service Delivery 
Competitive governments require service deliverers to compete for their business, based on 
their performance and price. 
 
Mission-Driven Government: Transforming Rule-Driven Organisation 
Mission-driven governments deregulate internally, eliminating many of their internal rules and 
radically simplifying their administrative systems, such as budget, personnel, and procurement. 
 
Results-Oriented Government: Funding Outcomes, Not Inputs 
Results-oriented governments shift accountability from inputs (“Did you follow the rules and 
spend according to the appropriated line items?”) to outcomes, or results. 
 
Customer-Driven Government: Meeting the Needs of the Customer, Not the Bureaucracy 
Customer-driven governments treat those they serve-the parents whose children they teach, the 
people who line up to renew driver’s licenses, or the general public-as their customers. 
 
Enterprising Government: Earning Rather than Spending 
Enterprising governments focus their energies not only on spending money, but on earning it. 
 
Anticipatory Government: Prevention Rather than Cure 
Anticipatory governments seek to prevent problems rather than delivering services to correct 
them. 
 
Decentralised Government: From Hierarchy to Participation and Teamwork 
Decentralised governments push authority down through the organisation or system, 
encouraging those who deal directly with customers to sake more of their own decisions. 
 
Market-Oriented Government: Leveraging Change Through the Market 
Market-oriented governments often restructure private markets to solve problems rather than 
using administrative mechanisms such as service delivery or command-and-control regulation. 
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efficient working of public sector wage policy. Common among these are the existence 
of large barriers to entry to the government; a policy of attempting to lock in widely 
differing career streams into uniform government grades and pay scales; and inadequate 
performance objectives and monitoring.33 
For public sector performance that is supportive of private sector production, the 
institutional framework should be supportive of efficiency in government. Thus the 
ability of the government to self-police which is do critical to the success of its 
objectives has to be an important part of a package that is offered to the public servant. 
The literature on reform and growth emphasises concepts of downsizing and re-
orienting the public sector as well as community participation and the development of 
civil society.34 The general view is that development of rules and institutions is enough 
for achieving the necessary governance and civil society objectives required for 
growth. The agents who will make this happen are often not taken into account. 
This paper argues that the allocation of talent especially its use in the public sector 
is likely to be important to the successful implementation of development plans. 
How the incentives are structured for the technocrats, the managers, and the 
professionals will determine the talent that offers itself to run key institutions and 
organisations, and could determine the efficiency of policy implementation and 
design. One explanation for the weak performance of the public sector in Pakistan 
may be the lack of attention to Pakistani talent in the design of reform. While 
many  reforms  were being planned and implemented badly, Pakistani talent, not 
being able to find a place at home, was migrating abroad. Many of the expatriate 
thinkers on reform were unable to see the implications of this, since in more 
developed economies skills are abundant. In Pakistan, the skill shortage has been 
significant, prompting donors to attempt to fill the ever-widening gaps through 
out-migration of skills through expatriate experts financed by technical assistance. 
Civil service reforms have primarily been concerned with cost-cutting and 
containment. The issue of productivity and the need for appropriate human capital 
for it have largely been secondary. The paucity of human capital has been 
recognised, but only to talk about a slower pace of modernisation and an increased 
reliance on external technical assistance. The migration of skills and the possibility 
of correcting the prices such that domestic skills resident overseas may return is 
seldom considered seriously. However, it is asserted that the lack of domestic 
skills may not make it possible to operate a level of efficiency that is obtained in 
the advanced industrial countries. For example, the New Public Management 
approach which relies on autonomous performance-based agencies for the 
management of the public sector is considered to be inappropriate primarily 
because of the shortage of technical skills (see Box 1). 
33Reinventing government. 
34For more recent discussions of the importance of rules in the development process see Douglas 
C. North (1993) and Dhonte and Kapur (1996). 
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Reform must therefore take into careful consideration the organisation of 
the public sector as well as the skill retention at home, aspects which were ignored 
in the past. It is only through such reform that the intermediate good of governance 
will be efficiently produced. And it is the governance good that has been 
increasingly found to be an important cornerstone of a country’s institutional 
foundation. In developing the public sector, it is important to consider the human 
capital that the public sector is able to attract as that will determine the quality of 
its output. Consequently, as we have shown the next generation of civil service 
reform must bear in mind the incentives to human capital in the public sector. The 
structure of wages in the public sector is, therefore, an important policy tool for 
maintaining public sector efficiency. 
The issue of public sector management and wage policy also has 
implications for the control of corruption. Many developing countries have found 
corruption to be an important impediment to the development process (see Mauro 
(1996). Haque and Sahay (1996) and Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1991) have 
shown that an appropriate response for dealing with corruption and rent seeking 
may be the retention of appropriate incentives for skills and honest productive 
behaviour in the public sectors in developing countries. 
Domestic professions and the technical skills have proven to be extremely 
necessary to the development of civil society and better public administrations 
here in the U.S. Not only is the agglomeration of such skills important for the 
design of policy and reform, but also necessary for analyses and critiques that help 
foster domestic debate and ownership of such reform. Without this dissemination 
and debate, which can only be done by domestic groups, it is hard to see the 
development of civil society. Moreover, authoritative patrimonial states will 
remain unchecked, except through the international agency of restraint whose 
interests may or may not converge with those of the people. 
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